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Intangible Assets and National Income Accounting 
 
Introduction 
How do we measure intangible investment – investment to create new products 
and processes – in the national income accounts so that it can help us explain measured 
total factor productivity growth?  And how do we measure the economic growth due to 
new products that arise from intangible investment?  
In this paper I argue that this dual measurement task for the national income 
accounts has become central to economics today.  Improved measurement is likely to be 
necessary if we are to understand how best to encourage economic growth via public 
funds and intellectual property rights and to understand the sources of wealth. However, 
constructing these measures is complicated by the fact that it requires a shift in the 
fundamental paradigm of economics, from the “invisible hand” to “creative destruction.”  
The paradigm shift requires some adjustments as well in how we measure consumption, 
investment, and capital.   
For example, when we measure new consumer products’ contribution to growth, 
we must consider the consumer surplus that arises from them and the fact that consumers 
must learn about these products.  It is not sufficient to measure the change in prices of 
existing goods; in addition, the assumption that the consumer’s perception of the utility of 
goods is unchanging is untenable.   
Second, when new products are created, the real value of the creation, that is, the 
real intangible investment in their creation, which includes research, development, 
marketing, and institutional innovation, is each time somewhat sui generis. The units of 
measurement for these investments are not intrinsic, in the sense that the units of measure 
for a given model of car or laptop are intrinsic.  While we might use proxy units of 
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measurement (such as patents or citations), empirical work (Bessen, 2008, and 
Alexopoulos and Cohen, 2008, for example) has shown that the link between such units 
and the value of the creation is quite weak.  Thus, the units of measurement for deflating 
intangible investment either must be extrinsic (related to inputs or to alternative uses) or 
must depend on a research project’s future success. 
Third, in measuring intangible investments we need to recognize that the assets so 
created are non-rival.  As a consequence, the private value of these assets may diverge 
from their social value.  The social valuation is needed in order to explain growth, while 
the private valuation is needed in order to explain wealth creation.  In addition, the 
creation and introduction of new products typically requires expenditures on marketing 
and organizational change that need to be recognized as intangible investments too. 
I begin this article by pointing out how the U.S. economy has changed over the 
past half century, extending work by Zvi Griliches (1994).  I argue that mass production 
and tangible investment have become less important, while new products (including 
customized tangible products and intangible service products) and intangible investment 
have become more important.  This switch highlights the importance of measuring the 
contribution to welfare from new products.  
I then present two simple stylized models — one macro and the other micro —  to 
clarify the measurement issues that must be confronted.  The macro model is a stylization 
of growth theory models as set forth, for example, in Aghion and Howitt (1998).  The 
micro model sets forth and expands ideas on new goods, taking off from Diewert (1998, 
2007). I conclude with a brief discussion based on the ideas of  John Hicks (1956). 
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The Changing U.S. Economy and Growth Measurement 
  Cell phones and the Internet have had a dramatic impact on our lives.  Paul Romer 
(1994) has pointed out that the gains from trade that arise from new products such as 
these may substantially outweigh the gains from Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson factor 
equalization.  A country such as Somalia or even China would be unlikely to produce 
these products entirely on their own; the ability to trade for them acquires a value that is 
qualitatively different from a shift in relative prices.   
  Mass production lies at the heart of the “invisible hand” paradigm; the example of 
the pin factory and the benefits of division of labor in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
makes this clear.  Perfect competition and the law of one price assume that more than one 
firm can make many copies of the same product.  In his AEA presidential address, Zvi 
Griliches (1994) described the most readily measurable industries as being “agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, transportation and utilities.”  These are mass production 
industries.  I report Griliches’s data from that paper in the first column in Table 1; these 
industries are shown as declining from 49 percent of U.S. nominal gross national product 
in 1947 to 31 percent in 1990 — from nearly one-half to less than one-third of the 
economy, based on the SIC classification in use at the time.  In the second column I show 
currently available statistics, using the SNA industrial classification now in use, which 
show these industries declining from 43 percent of U.S. nominal gross domestic product 
in 1947 to 20 percent in 2007.  The products of easily measurable mass production 
industries have shrunken to just one-fifth of value added. 
  An alternative perspective on the changing U.S. economy can be seen by looking 
at the hardest-to-measure consumption expenditures in Table 2. These include medical 
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care, personal business services, education and research, and religious and welfare 
services.  As a group, these have risen from 10 percent of nominal personal consumption 
expenditures in 1947 to 33 percent in 2006.  In this group, precisely what is consumed is 
in many cases controversial and there are no market prices in some cases.    
  The inflation rate in this group of products is measured to be faster than the 
average for all consumption expenditures; for the period from 1977 to 2006, the average 
inflation rate is more than 50 percent faster than for other consumption.  In part, this 
faster inflation rate may reflect our inability to measure inflation for these products; in 
many cases, we measure something closer to inputs than true outputs.  This remains true 
despite very vigorous efforts on the part of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis to improve these measures. 
  The intrinsic difficulties are compounded by the rapid introduction of new 
products.  Rapid innovation in medical care and in personal business services makes it 
even harder to develop reasonable inflation measures. The difficulties of measuring 
output for nonmarket sectors have been emphasized by Diewert (2008).   
  When we cannot properly measure inflation, we cannot properly measure growth.  
A theory of endogenous growth seeks to link intangible investments to growth, which 
means we need ways of measuring the real growth due to new products.  A further 
difficulty is that the connection between intangible investments and output is bedeviled 
by uncertainty – the probability distributions of returns to investments in intangibles are 
highly skewed (Scherer, 1984, and Scherer and Harhoff, 2000). 
   6
New Measures of Investment 
New measures of intangible investment expenditures by Nakamura (2003), 
Corrado et al. (2005), and Corrado and Hulten (2008) suggest that these investment 
expenditures have risen from roughly 4 percent of U.S. GDP in 1977 to 9 to 10 percent in 
2006.  The U.S. economy is making an ever larger investment in new product 
development (Figure 1).  These measures of intangible investment include investment in 
software, research and development, marketing, and organizational change.   
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis has, since 1998, included software in its 
measures of private business investment in the national income accounts.  In addition, 
research and development is now included in a satellite account.  Figure 2 shows four 
concepts of U.S. private business fixed investment, as a nominal percent of U.S. nominal 
gross domestic product: the first is based on tangible investment only, using the pre-1998 
definition of business fixed investment. If we were to use this concept, we would think 
that U.S. investment was at roughly its low for the postwar period. This would depict an 
economy where investment was faltering. The second concept is the current one in the 
accounts, which includes software.  With this change, we see investment neither rising 
nor falling; investment in 2006 is about at its postwar average. 
The third concept adds in research and development from the BEA satellite 
account for R&D (Fraumeni and Okubo, 2002); I have updated it with data from the U.S. 
National Science Foundation on U.S. R&D paid for by firms.  This shows investment as a 
proportion of U.S. GDP to be above the rates before 1977 but appearing roughly trendless 
since the late 1970s. 
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The fourth concept adds in marketing and organizational change.  This includes 
data on advertising and other administrative and training expenses associated with new 
products (Nakamura, 2003, Corrado et al., 2005).  While the public may not need to be 
informed about existing products such as butter and milk, new products such as new 
video game platforms or organic soy milk or new mortgage or insurance or medical 
products may require learning on the part of consumers. In addition, success at 
developing and producing new products may require scarce managerial talents and new 
managements methods (see, for example, Andersson et al., forthcoming). 
When we include marketing and organizational change, total business investment 
continues to trend upward throughout the period, with 2006 investment at the highest it 
has been with the exception of the Internet bubble (McCann-Erickson (2007), Nakamura 
(2003), and Corrado and Hulten (2008)).  This shows an economy that is very dynamic 
and becoming more so, with one-sixth of all expenditures devoted to investment.  
These four different views of the economy illustrate the proposition that how we 
measure the economy deeply affects our views of the dynamics of the economy.  How we 
define investment is a crucial element in our understanding of economic growth. 
These data show U.S. industries, consumption expenditures, and investment 
expenditures, all changing very substantially away from mass production and toward new 
product development, with only some of the new products being ones that can be mass 
produced. Properly analyzing this economy requires new measures and new theory. 
Changing Growth Theory 
  We want to consider how to measure investment in intangibles, with a view to 
completing the Solow-Jorgenson program of measuring inputs so as provide an economic 
   8
answer to the question of where growth comes from: what causes total factor productivity 
growth?  This question is first raised concretely in Solow (1957), and Jorgenson has 
proposed a series of frameworks, beginning with Jorgenson (1966) and continuing 
through Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006), for analyzing this question through the national 
accounts. 
  The production function that Solow (1956) introduced to study growth takes the 
following well-known form: Qt = AtF(Kt,Nt), where Q is output, A is a measure of the 
state of technology, F is a constant-returns-to-scale production function, K is capital, and 
N is labor.  
Tangible capital accumulation takes the general functional form g, with both 
partial derivatives positive, which Solow assumed to take the following linear form, 
where δ is the rate of depreciation of capital, and I is new gross investment in tangibles: 
Kt = g(Kt-1, It) = (1-δ)Kt-1 + It
Omitting government and net exports for simplicity, Solow’s economy has a GDP 
composed of consumption and investment: Ct + It = Qt.  Solow (1957) considered 
technological progress A to be exogenous.   
Solow (1957) used this model to analyze the sources of growth by measuring the 
contributions of added capital, added labor, and improved technology over the period of 
1909 to 1949.
1  During that time, real output in the nonfarm business sector (a convenient 
grouping that avoids the measurement problems of the agricultural and government 
                                                 
1 The data on labor hours are from Solow's source, later published as John W. Kendrick, Productivity 
Trends in the United States (Princeton University Press, 1961). 
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sectors) grew at an annual rate of 2.9 percent.
2  Of this rate, 1.1 percentage points were 
due to an increase in the total number of hours worked (a product, in turn, of more people 
working a shorter number of hours each year, with the increase in workers outweighing 
the shortening of the work year). Of the remaining 1.8 percentage points, Solow reckoned 
that one-fifth (0.4 percent annually) was due to an increase in capital per worker, that is, 
people having more equipment with which to do their work. The remaining four-fifths 
(1.4 percent annually) was due to an increase in technological progress, that is, having 
superior procedures and equipment with which to work. Subsequent work by Edward 
Denison (1974) for the period 1929 to 1969 pushed up the annual contribution of 
technology to 1.7 percent annually.
3  The clear-cut evidence from these and other studies 
is that for most of the 20th century, most of American economic growth per worker was 
due to improvements in our technology – i.e., to intangible capital growth — rather than 
to increases in the amount of tangible capital per worker. Exactly how technological 
advance of this type occurs and to what extent the improvements in technology reside in 
organization of the workforce (working smarter) or equipment (smarter tools) is unclear. 
Indeed, technological advance came to be known as the “black box” of economic 
growth.
4
                                                 
2 In agriculture, the difficulty is counting the hours of farm owners and their families.  In the government 
sector the outputs — compulsory schooling, criminal justice — are hard to count because they are not 
priced in the marketplace. 
3 The 1.7 percent figure represents Denison's semiresidual, which includes both pure technological advance 
and economies of scale — productivity gains due to the increased scale of production.  Here, I am lumping 
the two together.  It is now generally recognized that technological advance and economies of scale are, in 
the long run, inseparable.  Output per person grew 2.1 percent during this period. 
4See, for example, the preface to Rosenberg (1982).  
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The statistical basis that Solow established for our understanding of the economy 
was and remains founded on the national income accounts. National income statistics 
form our basis for tests of macroeconomic propositions. Peter Hill (1999) has 
documented how the material basis for investment and assets came to be a foundational 
assumption and notes that this leaves open the issue of how intangible investments should 
be dealt with. 
In the intervening half century since Solow’s paper, progress on addressing the 
question of how to measure intangible investment has been modest, despite the efforts of 
many of the best minds of the profession. Beginning with Romer (1986) and summarized 
in Aghion and Howitt (1998), a new endogenous growth theory has been set forth that 
emphasizes sunk costs associated with new product development. New theory implies 
some changes in the national accounts. 
Intangible capital accumulation drives growth in technology.  Technological 
progress is created by intangible investment, denoted here by H. Parallel to the general 
form for tangible capital g, we can set At = h(At-1, Ht). However, the general functional 
relationship between H and A embodied by h (like g, with positive partial derivatives) 
has not yet been clarified.  See, for example, Madsen (2008).  It is generally assumed that 
in the absence of additional investment in intangibles, technological progress is assumed 
to be maintained, that is, A= h(A, 0).  Linearized, this would imply: 
At = h(At-1, Ht) = At-1 + Ht
That is, technological progress is not lost and does not depreciate from the social 
perspective.  
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Both tangible and intangible investments are valued not in themselves but for 
their consequences.  We value a flour mill and the work of novelists because they 
contribute to the production of bread and books.  These are investments that can result in 
benefit flows over extended periods of time, and thus, from an accounting perspective, 
we will typically want to amortize costs over an extended period of time. 
However, the lifetime of a tangible product is limited by physical wear and tear as 
well as by obsolescence.  A tangible product is usually rival too – when put to the use of 
one set of workers, it cannot be used by others.  An intangible is nonrival in the sense that 
it can be used by agents.  Piracy – the unlawful duplication of copyrighted works – is a 
demonstration of this nonrival character.   
Moreover, the intellectual property associated with the private value of an 
intangible is typically of limited duration.  For example, the basic integrated circuit 
patents – issued to Robert Noyce of Fairchild Semiconductor and Jack Kilby of Texas 
Instruments – expired in the 1990s.  The copyright to Jane Austen’s novels – which 
remain as popular as ever – has similarly expired.  In both cases, the social value of these 
ideas and expressions is greater than ever.  But their value as private wealth to their 
inventors or creators (or their heirs or assigns) has vanished. The social and private 
values of a tangible tend to coincide, while the social and private values of an intangible 
almost invariably differ. 
Thus, we need a separate equation for intangible private capital accumulation, B.  
This measure of wealth does depreciate, as the private value of intangible investment is 
subject to either the expiration of intellectual property rights or to the development of a 
superior alternative that makes it obsolete. That is, we need an equation of the form: 
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BBt = (1-δ) Bt-1 + Ht
The linear functional form here is more likely to be correct, since under profit 
maximization, the private investment in intangibles is made on the expectation that a 
dollar of investment will create (at least) a dollar’s worth of assets.  On the other hand, H 
is not mass produced.  Thus, the real units in which to denominate A and B are not as 
clear as they are for K.  With mass production, capital investment is composed of 
multiple copies of tools and structures that provide units, such as square or cubic feet, or 
computers, or tractors, or even copies of software programs.  There is a clear sense in 
which a price can be applied to a given unit of such an investment, whether produced in 
the same period or in different periods.  
  Work by Hulten and Hao (2008) shows that intangible investment can account for 
a large proportion of private wealth creation in the pharmaceuticals industry.  Work in the 
accounting literature such as Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Lev (2001) presents 
evidence that intangible investment results in private wealth creation across industries. 
  However, the intellectual properties that form this wealth — ideas and 
expressions that are created with intangible investment — are by their nature unique.  
The second invention of a given idea (in cases of multiple discovery) has nothing like the 
value of the first such invention.  
For technological progress, A, the units are determined ultimately by Q/F(K,N).  
That is, how to properly deflate A may be not be determined until after we have solved 
the riddle of economic growth. For example, Copeland and Fixler (2008) have proposed a 
mixture of input prices and patents to construct a deflator for R&D.  Yet it is well known 
that patents alone are not a good quantity measure of R&D output, precisely because 
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patents are not closely related to either economic or social value.  Patents weighted by 
citations may be more closely related to economic value but the linkage is still loose; see 
Alexopoulos and Cohen (2008), however, for a new sort of measure based on published 
works.  Neither patents nor patents weighted by citations are available in real time, since 
patents may not be granted until years after the intangible expenditures that give rise to 
them, whereas the Alexopoulos-Cohen sort of measure, relying on published works about 
an important new product or process, is potentially available in real time to the extent that 
the inventions are important enough to inspire authors to write about them as they are 
being discovered and brought to market.  Discovering how best to deflate intangibles as 
output – and thus the productivity of the sectors that produce intangibles – is an important 
project that is unlikely to be complete until we have a relatively settled understanding of 
endogenous growth.   
We may wish to deflate private wealth, B, with an input deflator (reflecting the 
accumulation of real inputs, from the income side, according to the Jorgenson-Landefeld 
proposal) or with an output deflator (reflecting the opportunity costs and consumption 
potential represented by the wealth).  But, again, there are no intrinsic units for this 
private wealth.   
Our two tentative conclusions from this brief look at a stylized model of 
endogenous growth are: First, we no longer have a single measure of capital 
accumulation; we have two: social capital, to explain growth, and private capital, to 
explain wealth.  Second, there are no intrinsic units by which to deflate either private or 
social investment as an output. 
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The private amortization of the private wealth – the temporary monopoly rents 
granted the holder of intellectual property – is in principle comparatively straightforward, 
even though we have not yet solved this problem. (Hall (2007) has discussed the 
considerable empirical problems with measuring depreciation of research and 
development.) The different rates of amortization in turn imply that social and private 
accounting for national income will differ for both nominal and real values.   
Additional challenges for macroeconomic measurement and for international 
measurement have been pointed out by McGrattan and Prescott (2001 and 2008). 
However, Diewert and Huang (2008) have pointed out that the assignment of 
amortization costs over the possibly infinite lifetime of an intangible is essentially 
arbitrary.    
Now we consider the microeconomic counterparts of this growth theory.  In the 
next section, we make the point that we need to measure new products’ contribution to 
consumer utility if we are to quantitatively link intangible investments and growth. 
Microeconomics Model 
  If economic growth takes the form of a greater quantity of existing goods, then 
measuring output is not too difficult.  If one year there are 10 million cars produced and 
the next year there are 11 million of the same kinds of cars, then output growth is likely 
to be in the vicinity of 10 percent (providing composition doesn’t change too much).  
That kind of output growth is straightforward and easily understandable. However, when 
economic growth is linked to new consumer products, output measurement becomes 
much harder.   
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  Work by John Hicks (1956) and Erwin Diewert (1976, 1978) has created a 
remarkably rigorous foundation for the measures of price and output in the national 
income accounts when the goods are the same in two periods.  A true cost of living index 
gives the cost of maintaining a given level of utility; it is the ratio of expenditure 
functions that corresponds to a given utility level and two given sets of prices.  A money 
metric utility function can then be constructed that relates the increase in actual 
expenditures to the true cost of living index to tell us by what proportion actual 
expenditures exceed or fall short of the level necessary to maintain constant utility; these 
in turn give us the compensating and equivalent variations of Hicks. 
Diewert’s work (1976) built on that of Hicks by defining a superlative price index 
as one that approximates a true cost of living index for a flexible functional form utility 
function to the second order. He went on to show that certain families of price indexes 
are superlative for different utility functions. In a remarkable paper, he then showed that 
all superlative price indexes tend to closely approximate one another (Diewert, 1978).  A 
Fisher ideal index is one such superlative index, so we know that the Fisher ideal price 
index is a very good approximation of the true cost of living index.  Put another way, the 
Fisher ideal quantity index provides us with a reasonable mapping to consumer surplus. 
A true cost-of-living index answers the question, how much must I spend to 
maintain my living standard?  For example, if I must spend 5 percent more money this 
year to give me the same enjoyment as last year, a true cost-of-living index would rise by 
5 percent.  Such an index ought to take into consideration the changing relative prices of 
goods and new goods and services that become available, because to take advantage of 
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these changes as they occur, I will likely buy a different bundle of goods this year, even if 
I can still afford to buy what I bought last year. 
  Relative price changes.  Suppose I buy only clothing and computer supplies.  In 
2007, I had $200 to spend on articles of clothing priced at $10 each or on computer 
supplies also at $10 each, and I bought 10 clothing items and 10 computer items.  In 
2008, I earn 5 percent more, or $210, and clothing increases in price to $12, while 
computer supplies decrease in price to $9.  I could again buy 10 clothing items and 10 
computer items, but I choose to buy 7 clothing items and 14 computer items. 
  It can be inferred that my standard of living has improved: I could have bought 
exactly what I did last year, but I didn't. I prefer what I am buying, which I couldn't buy 
last year, so I am better off.  A true cost-of-living index should help us measure, as 
precisely as possible, this improvement in living standard.   
  In general, a Laspeyres price index (which compares today's cost of the base year 
consumption bundle to what it cost back then) will tend to understate improvements in 
welfare and overstate price increases, while a Paasche price index (which compares 
today's cost of today's consumption bundle to what it would have cost back then) will 
tend to exaggerate improvements in welfare and implicitly understate price increases.  
These effects increase as prices diverge further from those in the base year. So when 
there are divergent price trends, these effects accumulate over time until the base year is 
updated.    
  A remarkably good fix for the problem, proposed early in this century by 
economist Irving Fisher, is to average the quantity-based index and the price-based index 
and chain them.  Fisher's so-called ideal index multiplies the two indexes and then takes 
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their square root.  In our example, this would result in an inflation rate of 2.4 percent, 
about midway between the Laspeyres price index and the Paasche price index. The U.N. 
System of National Accounts has begun emphasizing chain-weighted price and output 
indexes in its reporting of gross domestic product and components.
5 What Diewert’s 
remarkable result tells us is that this price index will closely approximate a true cost of 
living index and that the real output growth rate will approximate a money metric utility 
index. For a world without endogenous growth, this fulfills Pigou’s goal to find a national 
income that represents “a measure of national welfare brought into relation with the 
measuring rod of money” (see Nakamura, 2007, for additional discussion and references). 
  Suppose there are new goods.  Then we have a more difficult problem. Franklin 
Fisher and Karl Shell (1972) have shown that to approximate the utility index for a new 
product, what is needed is to price the new product in the period before its introduction at 
the price at which the product would just have zero consumption. (This idea can be traced 
back to Hicks; see Diewert, 1998). Determining this Fisher-Shell shadow price is a 
daunting empirical challenge but not an impossible one.  Unfortunately, new goods are an 
important part of progress in many areas of consumption, such as the health and finance 
fields.  
  One way in which economists have modeled new goods is as new varieties.   
International trade theory has, in particular, seized upon the notion of new varieties to 
explain the fact that trade occurs mainly among developed countries rather than between 
developed (capital-rich) high-wage countries and (labor-rich) low-wage countries as the 
Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory would suggest. This viewpoint is evident in Krugman 
                                                 
5 For further discussion, see Triplett (1992.) 
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and Obstfeld’s undergraduate textbook (2008) and Feenstra’s graduate textbook (2004).  
However, the issue of how to measure variety remains controversial (see, for example, 
Bils and Klenow, 2001, and Diewert, 2007).  Moreover, Feenstra (1995) makes clear that 
the measured consumption value of variety is typically biased downward. 
  A further challenge is posed by the fact that with new goods, consumer learning 
may be occurring.  Indeed, in one of the small but growing number of studies performed 
on new products, Fisher and Griliches (1995) take as their preferred measure of inflation 
for a pharmaceutical product the view that learning on the part of consumers is taking 
place.  When consumers learn about the characteristics of a new product, the product on 
average is likely to rise in value for those who use it.  Consider a drug whose efficacy is 1 
for N consumers and 0 for the other N consumers.  If initially it isn’t known how to tell 
the first type of consumer from the latter, then the drug’s expected efficacy will be one-
half compared with when it is known how to differentiate the two types.  As knowledge 
increases, the sales base may shrink, but the monopoly price may rise. The Fisher-Shell 
shadow price must now be calculated using the utility function after the learning has 
taken place.   
  By contrast, under a standard neoclassical model of perfect competition, learning 
is ruled out by assumption. Moreover, if goods have existed for some time, learning 
dynamics are unlikely to be important in the aggregate, even if individual consumers 
must learn about each product over time, provided that the distribution of knowledge 
remains stable. Thus, it is most likely that learning will be important in the aggregate 
when there are new goods. Of course, consumers can learn negative as well as positive 
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things about products. But the greater weight will be on the products that consumers learn 
positive things about, so the average impact will be biased. 
  A similar issue applies to network externalities (see, for example, Economides, 
1996).  With network externalities, products become more valuable as the number of 
users increase.  A classic example is the telephone: one telephone is useless, and as more 
telephone users sign up, each telephone becomes more useful.  In this case as well, the 
utility of a consumer good rises over time; as a consequence, its price history is not a 
good guide to its utility: the demand curve shifts outward as the number of users 
increases.  Also, if two products compete to create a network, at first consumers may be 
reluctant to buy either.  This will bias the initial shadow price of the winning product 
downward. Again, for products that have existed for a long time, network externalities 
are likely to be unimportant if the network has become stabilized. 
  Solving these problems is a formidable but not insurmountable economic task. To 
gain confidence in our solutions, we must use a variety of methods to estimate the value 
to households of new products. In addition to attempting to measure direct gains from 
particular innovations as in Fisher and Griliches, there are aggregative methods that can 
apply to whole industries or consumption categories. Some broad methods have been 
suggested by Nakamura (1997, 1999). 
For example, to understand medical care we have the preliminary work of 
Aizcorbe and Nestoriak (2008), which measures output by diagnoses and allows us to 
recognize the rising number of diagnoses that improved medical technology has made 
susceptible to treatment. To move beyond that, we have to follow the controversial 
direction of measuring and quantifying medical outcomes, as Cutler and co-authors (for 
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example, 1998a, 1998b, and 2007) have done in a series of studies. A number of different 
approaches are valuable: studies relating progress in diagnoses to changes in measures of 
health outcomes, studies relating expenditures on new product development (new drugs 
and instruments) to intellectual property and private corporate and noncorporate wealth, 
and studies relating changes in longevity (both unadjusted and quality-adjusted) to 
measures of consumer welfare.  
  The following model formalizes a simple linear demand curve for a new product.  
Despite its simplicity, the model can incorporate learning and a quality ladder.  We 
investigate the impact of monopoly pricing, competitive pricing, and intangible 
investment.   
There is a representative household with a unit mass of labor, supplied 
inelastically.  The labor can be used to produce two goods, a numeraire good q0 produced 
at unit cost, and a second good, q1, produced at a labor cost of c.   
  For the representative household (also mass unity) the numeraire good has linear 
utility and the second good has quadratic utility. By giving the first good linear utility, we 
keep the marginal utility of income constant, effectively removing income effects.  This 
is reasonable for modeling cases where the second good is small relative to income.  
Quadratic utility implies a first order approximation to a general utility function; to this 





t Uq q q λ =+ −1
1
, with λ <<1.  The consumer maximizes this subject to the second 
good’s relative price p, and income y.  Household income at time t is  0 y qp q =+ .  The 
demand for the second good will be q1= λ - p.   
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Invisible hand case. To understand the usefulness of this model for our purposes, 
first consider the “invisible hand” case in which the second good is priced competitively.  
Cost of production in period t is ct < λ; under competition, pt = ct, and consumption is λ – 
ct.  Producing this quantity of the second good requires ct(λ – ct) units of labor, so 
production of the numeraire good is 1 - ct(λ – ct).  Utility is 1 + ½(λ – ct)
2.  The 
expenditure function to attain utility u is u - ½(λ – ct)
2.  Nominal income, equal to 
nominal consumption, is 1.  Now suppose that cost falls from ct to ct – a.  Nominal 
income remains 1; a true cost of living index to maintain the old utility is 1 + ½(λ – ct)
2 - 
½(λ – ct + a)
2.  Real income under our money metric utility function is 1/(1 – a(λ-ct +1/2 
a)). 
Diewert’s papers tell us that real income under money metric utility will be 
closely approximated by a Fisher ideal index of real output.  What that result tells us – 
and our model affirms – is that what we measure as real output growth in the national 
income accounts for existing consumer goods, as cost falls, is approximately the gain to 
consumers, in the form of consumer surplus, of using a money metric.   
Inventor case. Hypothetically at least, we can model new goods easily. Consider 
the case of an entrepreneur working alone. Since new product inventions bestow 
temporary monopoly powers even without patents, and since inventors do also sometimes 
take out patents, one way of modeling the activity of such an entrepreneur is as follows. 
We view the inventor as a one-person monopolistic business owned by a household. At 
time t, the monopolist, owned by the representative household, sells the new good to 
maximize profit.  Facing the household’s linear demand curve, the monopolist sets the 
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new good’s price to
2
c λ +




= .  Monopoly 







  The monopoly firm at time t produces ½ (λ-c) units of the new good, and the 
household contributes ½ c(λ-c) units of labor.  The household contributes 1 - ½ c(λ-c) 
units of labor to producing the existing good.  Nominal income is 1 + ¼ (λ-c)
2; nominal 
income increases because of monopoly profit.   
  Consumer utility under the price p is q0 + ½ (λ-p)
2; the second term is the 
consumer surplus from the purchase of the new good. Under the monopoly price, 
consumer utility is q0 + 1/8 (λ-c)
2.  The expenditure function e(p,u) of the representative 
household is the cost of reaching utility level u given price p.  This is u - ½ (λ-p)
2 =  
u -1/8 (λ-c)
2.  The compensating variation C= e(pt, ut-1) -  e(pt-1, ut-1), and the equivalent 
variation E = e(pt, ut) -  e(pt-1, ut) will be the same, since the marginal utility of income is 
the same in both time periods.   
  Table 3 shows the results when we parameterize λ and c, under perfect 
competition and monopoly.  Scenario 1 shows the case when a new good is introduced 
without intellectual property rights, so that pricing is competitive, when λ = 0.1 and c = 
0.02.  In this case, money metric utility rises by 0.3201 percent, and real output, as 
measured by a Fisher ideal quantity index, rises 0.3195 percent, provided that the Fisher-
Shell price is used in the period before the new good is introduced.  On the other hand, if 
the new good price is ignored, then there is no increase in real output. 
  In the competitive case of a fall in cost, and in simple movements of the new good 
from monopoly to competitive pricing and vice versa, the Fisher ideal index performs just 
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as one would expect from Diewert’s work, very closely approximating the money metric 
utility.   
  The same close approximation holds good in the monopoly case, where a firm has 
intellectual property rights over the new good, if the Fisher-Shell price is used.  However, 
when the quality of the good rises as a result of learning, whether pricing is competitive 
or monopoly, the Fisher ideal index does not closely approximate a true money metric 
index.  
  Quality ladder case.  Finally, suppose there is a quality ladder.  In case I, the 
original innovator’s good is made obsolete by a new, improved version of the same good, 
produced by a rival.  The quality of the new good is 0.12, up 20 percent from 0.1.  This is 
not a drastic innovation, and the rival must price the new good exactly so as to make the 
original monopolist’s good obsolete.  The price of this new good is then 0.024.  The 
original monopolist is able to set a price of 0.02 and still break even, but at this price no 
one will buy.  If we capture the fall in the obsolete good’s price from 0.06 to 0.02 in our 
Fisher ideal price index, we still understate the gain in consumer utility due to the new 
good (scenario 6).  In case II, the second monopolist’s good is made obsolete by a third 
innovator, whose good’s quality is up another 20 percent, for a quality of 0.144.  The 
second innovator’s price falls from 0.024 to 0.020.  Even less of the gain in consumer 
utility is captured by nominal income growth divided by the Fisher ideal price index 
(scenario 7). 
  It can readily be shown that the real growth rate of output (with the money metric 
utility function) is closely approximated by a Fisher ideal quantity index provided that the 
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price of the new good is set so that consumption exactly equals zero, that is, so that the 
price equals λ. 
  Learning case. Learning or network externalities in this model are represented as 
a change in λ.  If λ rises from one period to the next, the impact on real quantity under the 
money metric is not captured accurately by a Fisher ideal quantity index.  These are 
illustrated for the competitive case and the monopoly case in scenarios 6 and 7. 
  Once we have measured the social value of new products via these or other 
methods, we need to systematically relate them to intangible investment in their own and 
related industries.  By building up a series of case studies that join private and social 
measures of intangible capital to private wealth measures and national growth measures, 
we can develop a sturdy theory of measurement and powerful theories of endogenous 
growth. 
  We can extend this model to include intangible investments and intangible capital.  
As modeled above, under the assumption of free entry into intangible investment, at the 
margin expected investment must equal the discounted present value of future returns.   
A Scientific Revolution in Economics? 
Ever since Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776), most economists have 
espoused the view that a specific aspect of competition called perfect competition is the 
main spur to economic efficiency. A key aspect of perfect competition is that many firms 
have access to the set of production possibilities and that economies of scale are 
sufficiently small that no single firm can dominate any market through low costs.  The 
paradigm of perfect competition carries with it the first welfare theorem: that an economy 
of perfect competition uses economic resources efficiently.  Combinations of firms to 
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monopolize markets are inefficient, and antitrust legislation is an instrument of good 
government in maintaining an efficient economy.  This confident welfare judgment is a 
hallmark of perfect competition. 
A key factor omitted from perfect competition is the potential for new products.  
Missing from the model of perfect competition is the possibility that firms can use 
economic resources to develop new products and that firms may simply gain, or might be 
legally granted, temporary monopoly rights – intellectual property — to the new products 
they have developed.  Similarly missing is learning and technological diffusion – that 
consumers and producers might need to learn about new products before being able to 
use them efficiently.  The paradigm of perfect competition underlies our national income 
accounts and is reflected in our theory of price measurement as well as our measures of 
nominal economic activity.  In particular, stocks of private intangible assets have 
historically not been included in our measures of private wealth, and temporary 
monopoly, based on intellectual property, is not considered a relevant factor of 
production. 
In  Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942), Schumpeter argued for an 
alternative paradigm for economic theory in which creativity was the prime mover in a 
modern economy, and profits were the fuel. He argued that what is most important about 
a capitalist market system is precisely that it rewards change by allowing those who 
create new products and processes to capture some of the benefits of their creations in the 
form of short-term monopoly profits. Competition, if too vigorous, would largely deny 
these rewards to creators and instead pass them on to consumers, in which case firms 
would have scant reason to create new products. These monopoly profits provide 
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individual entrepreneurs with the means to fund innovation in response to perceived 
opportunities and to make them known to the potential purchasers of the new products, or 
firms with the expected returns to justify supporting in-house research departments. 
  The alternative paradigm has not been easy to make into a theory that can stand 
on the same footing as the new one.  Beginning with Romer (1986) and Aghion and 
Howitt (1992), and summarized in Aghion and Howitt (1998), a new endogenous growth 
theory has been set forth that emphasizes sunk costs associated with new product 
development. But the new theory implies that the national accounts must be set up 
somewhat differently.   
How should economists and noneconomists think about the possibility of a 
paradigm shift in economics? British economist and Nobel laureate John Hicks (1983) 
argues that economic science must adapt to the nature of the economy. The growing 
importance of creative endeavors appears to be what’s new in the economy. If so, this 
represents a significant change in the nature of the U.S. economy, one that is difficult to 
align with the paradigm of perfect competition. This new economy is highly competitive, 
but creative destruction, not production, is the center of the competition. This implies, in 
line with Hicks’s views, that for understanding economics now, Joseph Schumpeter’s 
“creative destruction” paradigm may be superior to Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.”    
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Table 1. 
Zvi Griliches’s (1994) “Measurable” Sectors* of GNP (GDP), 
Nominal, percent 




Percent of GNP 
(2) 
Current SNA Data 
Percent of GDP 
1947 48.7 43.4 
1959 44.3 38.4 
1969 40.3 34.2 
1977 38.2 32.3 
1990 30.9 24.8 
2007  19.9 
 
 
Table 2.  The rising importance of measurement difficulties in consumption 




  1947  1959 1969 1977 1990 2006   
1.PCE  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  3.6 
2.Medical 
Care 












1.3  1.6 1.7 1.8 2.3 2.6 4.2 
6. Hardest-
to-Measure 
10.0  13.4 17.2 20.1 27.6 33.3  4.9 
7.  Other  90.0  86.6 82.8 79.9 72.4 66.7  3.2 
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Table 3.  When does the Fisher ideal index work? Comparing modeled money metric 
utility with Fisher ideal index measured growth in 9 scenarios 
















Fall in cost 
0.1  0.02 to 0.01  0.0851%  0.0850% 
3. Monopoly to 
competitive 
0.1 0.02  0.0801%  0.0798% 
4. Competitive to 
monopoly 
0.1 0.02  -0.0798%  -0.0798% 
5. Monopoly 
intro new good 
0.1 0.02  0.2402%  0.2400%* 
(0.1600%)** 
6. Monopoly 
quality ladder I 
0.1 to 0.12  0.02  0.2598%  0.1502% 
7. Monopoly 
quality ladder II 
0.12 to 0.144  0.02  0.2694%  0.0508% 
8. Competitive 
learning 
0.1 to 0.12  0.02  0.1803%  0.0000% 
9. Monopoly 
learning 
0.1 to 0.12  0.02  0.1348%  0.0449% 
* Using Fisher-Shell shadow price  ** Ignoring new good pricing
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Investment: In the US, Intangibles are 
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Four views of US Private Business Investment: View 1
Old Definition -- Excludes Software






















































Four views of US Private Business Investment:
View 2 Current Official Definition
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Four views of US Private Business Investment:
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Four views of US Private Business Investment
View 4: All Intangibles Included
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